Do note there could be subkeys as well.

Fixed in 0.3.2.

Just a reminder, this is important for 384 bit keys (see T6379).

These gpgsk files are standard private-keys-v1 files with an additional Backup-info line showing for example the keygrip.
There are no certificates in the file, thus we can either use gpg or gpgsm as driver.

Hard to test without instrumenting the code.

Tested during development.

@alexk and me tested this. The core functionality works.

Works for the two sample RSA cards. Ticket may eventually be re-opened if we run into problems with ECC cards.

Fixes are already in GnuPG 2.4.4 and can't be easily tested. Thus closing also for gnupg24

It is already implemented and will soon show up in 2.4.4 -)

Sorry, we won't do that. Please search on the Net for reasons why this is not a good idea. In any case you better move to Ed25519 or - if you really feel like this - to X448. The GnuPG FAQ als gives a rationale why larger keys are not useful.

• To configure a keyserver none I have now T6950: Kleopatra: Usability improvements for directory services configuration
• For tarball naming I created T6952: Gpg4win build system: Include commit hash in tarballs from gen-tarball.sh
• For the about dialog I have T6953: Kleopatra: show commit id in about dialog

In T6946#181608, @werner wrote:

The min-rsa option was introduced due because the de-vs compliance allowed 2048 bit until the end of 2023 and we used a trick in our configuration file to switch that relaxed handling off with this year. I don't think that the --ciompliance option is really useful becuase it would also disallow ed25519.

A better option would be an --assert-algo option similar to the --assert-signer which we already have in gpg.

But thanks for reporting! I really like feature requests so please do not feel discouraged to request more features.

Sorry, but this is a "Wontfix" we do not support this by choice. We think that adding photos to certificates both gives a wrong sense like "I know that picture, iit must be this person" and also increases the sizes of the certificates a lot. It is in our opinion a misfeature in the OpnePGP specificationl.

I noticed the Debian bug and was about to answer but a feature request is also a good thing.

In T6708#181592, @werner wrote:

I would also suggest that we show the git last git commit in Kleo's About dialog. That makes it far easier to see what we are testing. The Kleo version numbers are a bit arbitrary.

I would also suggest that we show the git last git commit in Kleo's About dialog. That makes it far easier to see what we are testing. The Kleo version numbers are a bit arbitrary.

Sorry, it was my fault building the test installer.

To be clear: This ticket is only about GnuPG (more precisely dirmngr) and the changes are included in VSD and Gpg4win.

Hi, ebo I would still think this is resolved. Because it was never meant that the user manually enters the value of "none" because there is no hint for the user that "none" is a reserved word. It should either be administratively configured which does not make much sense for Gpg4win or provided by the distribution. If left empty the default of GnuPG should be used. If we really want users to deactivate keyserver access by using "none" in the dirmngr.conf a much better solution would be a checkbox for this. In that case I would open a new issue.

The fix was not included in the Testbuid...

Does not work in Gpg4win-4.2.1-beta178

Example output:

Interesting. I need to look closer at it. I scheduled it for 2.4 but it won't be in the forthcoming 2.4.4. There are still other interesting things on the short list (e.g. timestamping support) but we may do that only in 2.6.

Thanks for the report. It comes right in time for the next release. It might already be fixed due to a lot of changes in the pkcs#12 parser.

I think this is resolved now.

Now you can untar and run

The extra option --debug-allow-pin-logging was implemented with commit rGe43bd2a7a78.

Yeah we should do an ntbtls release. As a core library it does no matter much which workboard we use. Let's remove it the vsd tag.

thats great news! I will test the keyword with Archlinux's Builds System (and Fakeroot) as soon as possible!

I sued the done column because we have not assigned it to any milestone.

Fixed a long time ago.

With rG239c1fdc28dcd0dc7aa5341be7c966da2231642a we now have a socketdir keyword for gpgconf.ctl. man gpgconf and look for that file. Will be released with 2.4.4.

Note that we now have also an option instead of the workaround from 2015

GnuPG 2.2 and 2.4 now have --pcsc-shared option for a user who can control his action in detail.
So, closing this bug report.

@aheinecke as promised, attached some test vectors:

This has always worked on the client site since we implemented keyserver access.

I see no problem to return only revocation packets. Clients must verify them anyway against their public keys and the fingerprint makes this easy. Verification against a primary key delivered along the revocation is more or less useless because that primary key must anyway been looked up in the client's keyring and th local existance of a primary key is anyway required to ask a keyserver for a revocation.

The trick here is that during import gpg tracks those invalid signatures and then tries to apply them to other keys.

Appended. Yes, it is considered an invalid signature and ignored. Anyone can insert an invalid signature. The trick here is that during import gpg tracks those invalid signatures and then tries to apply them to other keys. The use case here is this:

If you need the fingerprint, why don't you take it from the revocation certificate - for many years it is in subpacket 33.