CryptGenRandom is only used as an additional source of entropy and doesn't count towards our entropy estimation. Thus whether it is used of not does not make any difference. Our main entropy source is meanwhile the jitter based RNG. Thus your request will receive a low priority.

While performing some initial investigation regarding observed discrepancies between compiling GPGME directly and the subsequent SWIG static object for T4086, confirmed the relative ease by which multiple installations would be achievable if performed as a post-build process. This would have the added advantage of being more readily customisable by package maintainers downstream and not just for Debian, it could be made to work more easily with other distributions or other posix systems too.

Obvious benefit will be:

• It will be easier for developers who use pkg-config for their applications, and want to use gpgme. They can use pkg-config for gpgme.

Since first observing this … annoyance … the following updates have been made: Emacs has been upgraded to version 26.1, Org-Mode has been updated multiple times, including significant changes to Babel and the XHTML export, python-mode has been updated, multiple variations on the source blocks have been attempted, the document has had any and all tabs stripped out and replaced, plus each code block has been refactored and re-entered multiple times.

I've now run the proposed patch on a GNU/Linux system where the kernel's RNG is initialized but /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail shows numbers below 100, and i can confirm that 3072-bit RSA key generation takes roughly 0.8 seconds: 20 sequential default --quick-keygen operations (each creating two secret keys) took ~32s.

Here is another example of users doing sketchy things to try to "fix" this process:

Here is an example of the kinds of UI/UX mystery that users face while this decision is unresolved:

I can't reproduce the problem with multiple instances of gpg-agent and scdaemon.
However, gpg-agent continues to run after the user has logged out. This is unacceptable, am I right?

Well, green is a shortcut on how to display the status of the signature. It came from the green frame KMail printed and it soley used to rely on that information. The idea was that gpgme tells you what it considers to be a good signature. Opinions and trust models meanwhile changed and thus we indeed need to update gpgme's suggestion.

Yay. Got it.

The problem with mnemonics based on words is that they are language dependent and only a small part of the world is fluent enough in English to spell/use them correctly. Thus anything based on ICAO spelling (Alfa, Bravo,...) is a better choice than arbitrary words from one language. Even if that meas to write down a longer string. A CRC is of course very useful.

It would be great if this feature were implemented with a mnemonic code option, with a built in checksum, as described in bip39: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0039.mediawiki Using the same bip39 standard (and perhaps others, as alluded to in T3497) would also improve compatibility with existing crypto key storage devices (i.e. cryptocurrency wallets used as smart cards).

Tester reports that this works now.

I got feedback from the user that had the problem. It's fixed with 2.2.9 which contains your commit afaik.

Dear Andre , all , T4020 does not even well-define the symptom and I
do not agree T4020 is a duplicate of T4079 . I'd close T4020 in favor
of T4079 . Many thanks . Mirko