If agent_write_shadow_key does now also check for an existing private key file, then I'd replace following code in cmd_readkey:

if (agent_key_available (grip))
  {
    /* Shadow-key is not available in our key storage.  */
    rc = agent_write_shadow_key (0, grip, serialno, keyid, pkbuf, 0,
                                 dispserialno);
  }
else
  {
    /* Shadow-key is available in our key storage but ne check
     * whether we need to update it with a new display-s/n or
     * whatever.  */
    rc = agent_write_shadow_key (1, grip, serialno, keyid, pkbuf, 0,
                                 dispserialno);
  }

with a simple call of agent_write_shadow_key (removing the maybe_update flag) and let agent_write_shadow_key do all checking for an already existing private key file and whether it's a stub file that needs updating.

Could this be a duplicate of T4924: pinentry: pinentry-curses doesn't allow to set no password or weak passwords on 80 char width and smaller terminals?

I think we should make it explicit - this will be safer. As of now agent_write_shadow_key will do a check only in its special update mode which should be okay for now.

I can't see any explicit thing there.

$term is 'alacritty', stty -a is:

speed 38400 baud; 54 rows; 180 columns;
lflags: icanon isig iexten echo echoe echok echoke -echonl echoctl
	-echoprt -altwerase -noflsh -tostop -flusho -pendin -nokerninfo
	-extproc
iflags: -istrip icrnl -inlcr -igncr ixon -ixoff -ixany -imaxbel -ignbrk
	brkint -inpck -ignpar -parmrk
oflags: opost onlcr -ocrnl tab0 -onocr -onlret
cflags: cread cs8 -parenb -parodd hupcl -clocal -cstopb -crtscts -dsrflow
	-dtrflow -mdmbuf rtsdtr
cchars: discard = ^O; dsusp = ^Y; eof = ^D; eol = <undef>;
	eol2 = <undef>; erase = ^?; erase2 = ^H; intr = ^C; kill = ^U;
	lnext = ^V; min = 1; quit = ^\; reprint = ^R; start = ^Q;
	status = ^T; stop = ^S; susp = ^Z; time = 0; werase = ^W;

The agent.log says that the error comes from pinentry-curses:

Hi, thanks for the quick turnaround

I tried to reproduce on my FreeBSD 14 machine and didn't get an error....

Make sure that the fix doesn't break "gpg --edit-key; keytocard; save" which explicitly does replace the private key with a stub file.

That's why I added some tags and also set me a reminder. We will try to get this into the next GPGME release we plan for this month.

I doubt that the bug is only in 2.2. The code in 2.4 is different but it may happen there anyway. It depends on the usage pattern.

(That's actually an old ticket but we still open)

@werner Seeing as you seem to be actively maintaining this project: is there any way to move this forward? This is breaking quite a few builds of development environments for my company and we are now applying similar patches ourselves but it would be nice to get this merged upstream.

@bnavigator Would it be possible to also add support for 3.11 and 3.12 here? That way this fix is a lot more futureproof.

Thanks for the description; this is good for documentation.

Note that for the OpenPGP implementations which use X25519 API, it is not possible to calculate [scalar]G with scalar having least significant three bits != 0.

(my example cert is 0x09BB0EEE)

That sounds like a great (and better) solution! Thank you for your attention & effort 👍🙏

See T6395 for the new feature. It will be released with 2.4.1 but it will take some time that it can actually be used because the other party needs to have an OpenPG implementation which supports this.

Agreed

I think the patch is okay.

It might be related to the GPGME test failure we had related to that. But I thought this was fixed in GnuPG.

Added SETQUALITYBAR support with some fixes for glitches when an error string was set. Wide characters seem to work OK.

Just had a look at the development version. There the observation is exactly the opposite, i.e. the Tags columns of the certificate list and of the user ID list are empty, but the tags are shown in the Tags column of the certifications list.

We came to the same conclusion -- the SHAKE digests are not usable for sign/verify operations the way how it is implemented now. But it would be more clear if we would have explicit allow-list.

After consulting with our certs lab and studying the code I think SHAKE should not be a problem for now. All of the _gcry_digest_spec_shakeXXX seem to neither have an mdlen nor a read() function. pk_sign and pk_verify seem to both call md_read() which should fail because of the missing read function, kdf checks _gcry_md_get_algo_dlen() which should also disallow SHAKE.

A finding has been that the icon theme switch is not detected at runtime. It would be nice if we could add this, especially if customers explicitly test the support for high contrast modes.

I forgot to restart Kleo after changing the contrast. Thus for the last one, we use a wrong set of icons. After restarting it looks like

FWIW:The assuan keytocard does not move the key - what you see is a side effect from unrelated code.

In rGeae28f1bd4a5632e8f8e85b7248d1c4d4a10a5ed#76893, @sandro wrote:

I am wondering why the global configs are not for all config options and for all of the various config files. That would make things for us and in general a lot easier. Also that the pinentry-program options was only for debugging was not obvious to us but we might continue to use it to avoid unnecessary wrappers around or symlinks.

Since I have closed T6377 which had high priority I am assigning this issue the same prio. Which I also think is appropriate.

I thought about this related to T6386 and I now agree with @ikloecker KEYTOCARD in SCD may not "move" the key. Otherwise it would be impossible to easily transfer a key to multiple smartcards. Since werner agreed in T6486 that this is a Bug and Unintended it can be closed as a duplicate as we do not need to further discuss this.

I have closed T4699 as a duplicate of this, even though T4699 was about simplification but IMO this is the same underlying problem.

I am downgrading this to wishlist. Even though I had worked on this a lot the regression risk is probably too high to fix this before GpgOL becomes obsolete.

I am closing this as a duplicate of T6117 even though it is not really a duplicate. But for me it does not make sense to keep this as a different issue because simplifying the dialog is directly related to making it more accessible.

We don't want to compile one gnupg for each desktop environment to have it hardcoded relative to gnupg but make it configurable depending on the DE used. As a fallback we could just symlink together gpg and the right gpg-agent which is rather cheap.

gpg-agent (I tested 2.4.something) looks at /etc/gnupg/gpg-agent.conf according to strace. I'm not sure why you think it doesn't, but maybe your older version really doesn't.

Thus the public key differs on wether the raw secret key or the masked (bit255 set, bit0..2 clear) has been used. And at what point in the code this was done. Shall we collect a list describing the differences of applications and on whether they have some mitigation for compatibility.

The code has meanwhile been reworked and the mentioned test server is not anymore available

Good catch. A similar problem might arise with SHA384 according to section D.R which states