Taking a look at other GNU manuals, both GNU make and GNU Bison have a better phrasing,
so I suggest the Bison way (https://www.gnu.org/software/bison/manual/html_node/index.html):

This manual (7 December 2019) is for GNU Bison (version 3.5), the GNU parser generator.

Ah, okay, then the phrasing is missleading, the sentence looks like libgcrypt was released on this date and not the manual.

Nope, that is correct, the last update of the manual was

@sarman: Your question is actually a support question and not a bug report. Please read the documentation, use the public help channels (so that other can also learn from the issue), or get in touch with a commercial support provider.

In T4883#133467, @werner wrote:

That option does the same as --disable-dirmngr which in trun has the same effect as disable-crl-checks

@werner wrote:

Sample how GpgOL handles this: https://dev.gnupg.org/source/gpgol/browse/master/src/keycache.cpp;6f5f48c3d60e0af52f1a9f0e51f60ee653eeeb31$269

I think what you're saying that there is *no way* to use GPGME in offline mode to validate x.509 certificates, and this is by design. Am I understanding that right?

After disabling the CRL check again in gpgsm.conf

I see no difference between the last two example stanzas that show you running ../run-verify. Are they supposed to have different output?

I'm aware of the metadata leakage risks of OCSP, and i share your concerns about them.

OCSP can't be the default because it enables a web bug. The responder immediately sees when a signature is verified or a data is encrypted to a certificate.

If CRLs or OCSP are a MUST in a given profile, and the cert chain has OCSP but no CRL, it seems like that profile should then try OCSP, rather than failing.

That option does the same as --disable-dirmngr which in trun has the same effect as disable-crl-checks; see gnupg/sm/server.c#option_handler. If you want to check the validity of the cert you check the TRUST status lines. This is what gpgme does for you. An example is gpgme.tests/gpgsm/t-verify. You can run the tests also manually, I do this as follows:

I think what you're saying that there is *no way* to use GPGME in offline mode to validate x.509 certificates, and this is by design. Am I understanding that right?

I can see no bug here. See my comment over at T4881.

It is a feature not a bug. For symmetric encryption the gpg-agent remembers the passphrase used for the encryption and thus for some time or until /gpgconf --reload gpg-agent/ it tries that passphrase for decryption.

This seems to be closely related to T4319 and due to to some, ahem, interesting configuration.

I see. Thanks for your explanation.

I see. Thus the problem is that IPWorksOpenPGP does not create proper OpenPGP private keys. I guess they use OpenSSL with their different CRT parameter style and do not convert them correctly. RFC-4880 says this in 5.5.3:

The secret key is this series of multiprecision integers:
o  MPI of RSA secret exponent d;
o  MPI of RSA secret prime value p;
o  MPI of RSA secret prime value q (p < q);
o  MPI of u, the multiplicative inverse of p, mod q.

FYI, pEp annoyance was addressed and handled here: https://bugs.debian.org/891882
By this patch: https://sources.debian.org/src/enigmail/2:2.0.11+ds1-1/debian/patches/0002-Avoid-auto-download-of-pEpEngine-Closes-891882.patch/

Thank you for your response.

For GnuPG, the error is: you don't have run-able libntbtls.so in your environment (because of your wrong configuration, perhaps) but you have it to link.
For GPGME, the error is: your linked libgpg-error.so.0 and the one which runs are different (because of your wrong configuration, perhaps).

You need to update the public key and convey it to the sender. This will solve the problems. You should also ask the sender to update their software so that an MDC is always used regardless of the flag.

I can't see any bug here so I will close this bug now.

Hi Werner,

Please use one of the mailing lists to solve your problem. 2.3 is a development version, so I wonder from where you got this version of GnuPG.

Thank you very much for the analysis. I'll forward the info.

The creating software is broken in regard to non-ASCII characters in the UID:

ssh does nut support brainpool curves and thus GnuPG does not know how to map its internal name of the curve to the name as specified by ssh. GnuPG supports these curves:

So the output of this was

Thanks @werner I will do tonight when connecting to my team mates PC.
Btw meanwhile I actually felt like I need to open next issue where I explain all my details

Your home is under /dev/ - really? Please run

Okay I think I got the root of the issue

When I did

brew reinstall gpg2

I saw this today

In T2203#88661, @nuimk wrote:

/usr/local/bin/gpg-agent -v --daemon

I'm closing this issues as "Invalid" because it is not an issue of Gpg4win. You can still comment and discuss here.

First let me say that it is never a good Idea to use outdated / unmaintained security software. PGP Messages are external input and you pass that to unmaintained software.

Fair enough. Let's wait and see what others think.

Also consider that it is possible to change the key usage flags. Thus it will never be clear whether one has a fixed or unfixed public key. I'd like to close this bug because it is currently also discussed in the IETF WG.

There is another argument for respecting the usage flags: it trims the admissible key space, if key ID in the PKESK packet is zero ('wild card') and thus all private keys have to be considered for decryption.

I disagree, and you don't have to try to convince me, the decision is with werner. I just want to give my opinion:
Bug compatibility is nothing esoteric or bad especially for a general purpose backend tool like gnupg. Being open to accepting broken input is a good thing because it will mean that we can get people out of a "broken tool vendor lock in".

i agree with @Valodim that it would be better to not have a warning at all for an attempt to decrypt from secret key whose public key has never been marked as valid for encryption. A strict failure there (as with a strict failure for lack of mdc) is a better scenario than a warning. If the user controls the secret key and they decide they want to be able to decrypt with it, they should be able to mark it as decryption-capable (if that's really what they want) and retry. But this is an action only for experts.

The same *cannot* be said for a subkey that is marked specifically for certification or signing, and not for decryption.

I understand the real world requirement for decrypting messages that have been encrypted to a revoked or expired key.

I don't see a problem. If you have the private key you can and will use it. I guess your concern is an oracle?

The platform is illumos, a fork of OpenSolaris.

No response.

No. But as of 3.0 GpgOL for Outlook 2003 and 2007 is no longer maintained and the support for this will be removed in some future version. This bug only affects new installations of GpgOL on the unmaintained (by Microsoft) Outlook 2003 and Outlook 2007 Versions. So -> Wontfix.

@aheinecke did you change the default?

werner says it's not a bug.

I am closing this, because this particular change was rejected. Eventually libtool might get updated on its own merits, so no need to track this here.

--with-fingerprint is an option to modify the output of --list-keys and not a command. There are other --with-xxxx options for other purposes. There is no command to list a keyring. This is why gpg meanwhile prints a warning when used without a command.

I don't think anyone is suggesting the use of gpg without a command. However, use WITH the --with-fingerprint command seems to be broken. Thank you for providing a correct way of doing what we want, but please either explain why the use of the --with-fingerprint command isn't working, or put this back as a bug.

The use of gpg without a command is simply wrong. This has never been specified and could actually lead to surprises.
You need to import the key first and then look at it with -k (--list-keys) or --fingerprint.

or am i missing something here?

Solution has been given: Use "gpg.conf-1" for gpg 1.4

Nobody started to hack on it in two years, and buried in this bug report nobody will find it. If this is still a desirable task, a new ticket should be opened.

and the platform is ...

The version of libtool that you ship does not have the necessary patches required to support my platform. Normally this isn't a problem because autogen.sh (or autoreconf) will update it.

You may not run your own version of libtool or libtoolize. Only the maintainer updates the autotools related files including libtool. This is to avoid bugs stemming from different or broken versions of autotools. This makes it much easier to reproduce bugs.

A few people asked for this generic option help; it is not specific to keyservers. Now we implemented that and still not okay for everyone, oh dear.

gpg: Note: '--keyserver' is not considered an option

Option parsing stops at the first non-option. "--keyserver" and "sec1...." could have also been key specifications.
Because sometimes people make errors we print a warning. But we can't bail out on a perfectly valid command line. That is the same why

No way to fix, itself. Better warning/error message can be done.

Sorry, I thought I would receive an email when this was updated.

We don't do this on-the-fly to avoid cluttering the /run/user with directories.

So, I was expecting gnupg to use /run/user/$UID/gnupg/. However, if GNUPGHOME is
set, it uses /run/user/$UID/gnupg/d.$GNUPGHOME_HASH/. Therefore, by "littering",
I assume you mean littering /run/user/$UID/gnupg/ (otherwise this argument makes
no sense).

I'm leaving this here for future readers as I can't find *any* documentation of
this behavior (the use of d.$GNUPGHOME_HASH).

---

Regardless, my actual goal is to move the homedir to ~/.local/share/gnupg (not
have multiple homedirs) as described in (T1456)
so I really do want sockets to go in /run/user/$UID/gnupg/. However, I'm
guessing that's not going to be possible.

I have now learnt how GCC uses 'undefined behavior' for aggressive optimization
and that this could break code doing unaligned accesses even on x86. So this
needs to be fixed after all.