I think there are some races in the crl updated code but no real harm.
To improve you patch we could write a wait_for_idle function which counts the active connections and the housekeeping threads. It would also need to block new connections etc.

I'll look into it.

Ok, I will reload the mail item then!

I can reproduce it if I enter your or an unknown IP address.

Thanks for reply.

I have a workflow now that does this without the openings. The mail is kept open by Outlook anyway when the properties are changed.

Mmh. It still makes a bit sense to me as I think it will be faster. But of course for memory mapped files the OS might decide.

Strange, I don't know of an issue that is related to that. There were a lot of changes to the DNS code but if you are using an IP. I've tested that using an IP works for me. I used https://192.146.137.99:443 for testing.

Indeed, I use a S/MIME certificate in Outlook for signing by default all e-mails. However, if I intend to send a PGP mail, I manually disable this feature and I manually opt for PGP signature & encryption. I am sure, that this standard procedure applied in this case. Therefore, I am surprised, that the message appears.

It worked as I expected. I've tested it with the run-messenger test and I can close and later "re-decrypt" again. The only surprising thing might be for your users that they have to unlock their secret key again if it is not already unlocked.

Right. While switching the Mail works for me if there are no other references to the mail open (e.g. If I have the mail opened in Outlook Spy switching does not work as the mail is not unloaded). It is better to make it explicit. The code is all there I just have to add a window message handler for it. I'll do that.

Thank you! The beta38 is working for me. Guess the mail->setPassWrite (true); line from the last commit did the trick. I did not need to reload the mail object again.

The problem is probably that you are also holding a reference to the mail in question. For me the close triggers an unload so that GpgOL completely detaches from the mail in question.
I've now added a more explicit tracking of when it should be allowed to write namely after our close with discard changes.

I tested these window messages with the provided beta build. Both messages gets processed and the e-mail is encrypted again but I still receive the 0x80004004 (E_ABORT) error when trying to save the message via the outlook api.

Marking this as resolved as it was forgotten in the testing state.

I think this is resolved by kleopatra's watchdog. There is a bug that the agent becomes unresponsive somehow then the loading also hangs but this is unrelated to kleopatra.

Sorry I did not see your first comment.

I would change gpgme_addrspec_from_uid and the gnupg equivalent to strip out the subaddress.

It does not make sense to handle this in the protocol. The client should always ask for joe@example.org and thus keep the whole thing mostly out of gpg. This requires that keys are not created with sub-addresses. However, if someone has a need for this, this strategy should work:

First let me say that it is never a good Idea to use outdated / unmaintained security software. PGP Messages are external input and you pass that to unmaintained software.

I've added two message handling routines and a small program to test it (run-messenger.cpp) You can use run-messenger.cpp for reference.

To reproduce it the key is to close Outlook through the file -> close option.

Fair enough. Let's wait and see what others think.

Also consider that it is possible to change the key usage flags. Thus it will never be clear whether one has a fixed or unfixed public key. I'd like to close this bug because it is currently also discussed in the IETF WG.

In the log I can see where it uses a non default codepath:

I don't think this answered my question -- i'm asking how adding --no-keyring affects gpgme_op_decrypt_verify -- it seems like verification would fail if no keyring is used, no?

gpgme_op_decrypt_verify can always be used instead of gpgme_op_decrypt. This is an obvious requirement because the signature and the fact that there is a signature is only known after the decryption step. The newer GPGME_DECRYPT_VERIFY of the gpgme_op_decrypt_ext function is basically an alias for gpgme_op_decrypt_verify.
For both functions gpgme employs "gpg --decrypt".

I'm fine with this change, but i do note that some people expect --decrypt to mean "decrypt and verify, if possible". In particular, gpg(1) says about --decrypt:

So far, so good.