Good idea.

for user ID selection, you could also potentially match on substring, so uid dkg could select/deselect all user IDs that contain "dkg".

Mnemonics can be made language independent by implementing wordlists for every language. In bip39, each word represents a number, 0 through 2047 (their index in the wordlist).

I don't think the cause of the corruptions is user interference. Users which report that don't even know about the GnuPG home directory in advance. I think we have some kind of rare bug which causes the keyring to break.

It seems it's Ubuntu specific: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/imagemagick/+bug/1796563

It became common, because many people now use larger keys.
For RSA-4096, three simultaneous connections for decryption may cause the failure.
In the experimental patch of D472: Limit active connections for gpg-agent, I limit gpg-agent to accept two connections only.

Agreed this looks like it should be made default behavior. This has affected many people I work with, and even with searching, this ticket never came up. I only found out about it by making a ticket myself. This issue looks like it has generated at least 3 tickets in this bug tracker, and the agent is raising memory errors during normal usage, which still smells like a bug to me.

The usual reasons for corruptions of binary data are FTP transfers in text mode; or opening a file with a Windows editor.

Got another reliable report in the Wald Forum about this. https://wald.intevation.org/forum/message.php?msg_id=6371&group_id=11

Uhm, if this option is useful why isn't it default behavior?

Not a bug :-). I should have read my own docs before starting a long debug session. The things is that the auto expanding of the secmem area is only done for xmalloc_secure and the internal MPI allocation functions. It is not dne for any memory which is allocated with xtrymalloc becuase those properly return an error to the caller. The idea is that if the caller wants to get an error back he has also the assurance that them memory is allocated in the non-swappable memory (i.e. not in the expanded parts of the secmem).

For my case, with $GNUPGHOME/gpg-agent.conf having debug-all, I observed that rsa_decrypt failes with 'Cannot allocate memory', after debug output of 'res'.
Reading libgcrypt/cipher/rsa.c, it is line 1439, where it calls sexp_build (MPI of PLAIN into SEXP of R_PLAIN).
I think that it does indeed memory failure here.
Having "auto-expand-secmem" in gpg-agent.conf, it goes well.

I can easily replicate this; it is a problem somewhere in the secure memory code of Libgcrypt.

Fix was released with 2.2.11

Thanks.

Pretty obvious. Thanks.

Hmmm

You seem to accept it. So Normal Prio and assigned to you :-p

Just as a note: I think the main selling point of GnuPG is that its stable. We care about backwards compatibility and we (are || want to be) rock solid. Even if there is a rare race. With millions of installations, that race will happen regularly. So I really would like us to get all this fixed without losing to much performance by locking to much.

Happens though. With the test invocation above there is only one key in the keyring.

1.9.0-beta68

Well, it should not happen if you always use the same key.

There is indeed a race condition between the passphrase cache and the pinentry invocation. There is even a comment on this somewhere in the code. The problem is that we would need to lock almost everything to avoid this rare condition.

Which Libgcrypt version?

Forgot to mention. run-threaded is a new test tool in GPGME.

I can reproduce it if I enter your or an unknown IP address.

I think this is resolved by kleopatra's watchdog. There is a bug that the agent becomes unresponsive somehow then the loading also hangs but this is unrelated to kleopatra.

Sorry I did not see your first comment.

I would change gpgme_addrspec_from_uid and the gnupg equivalent to strip out the subaddress.

It does not make sense to handle this in the protocol. The client should always ask for joe@example.org and thus keep the whole thing mostly out of gpg. This requires that keys are not created with sub-addresses. However, if someone has a need for this, this strategy should work:

Fair enough. Let's wait and see what others think.

Also consider that it is possible to change the key usage flags. Thus it will never be clear whether one has a fixed or unfixed public key. I'd like to close this bug because it is currently also discussed in the IETF WG.

Fixed in master and 2.2.

There is another argument for respecting the usage flags: it trims the admissible key space, if key ID in the PKESK packet is zero ('wild card') and thus all private keys have to be considered for decryption.

I disagree, and you don't have to try to convince me, the decision is with werner. I just want to give my opinion:
Bug compatibility is nothing esoteric or bad especially for a general purpose backend tool like gnupg. Being open to accepting broken input is a good thing because it will mean that we can get people out of a "broken tool vendor lock in".

i agree with @Valodim that it would be better to not have a warning at all for an attempt to decrypt from secret key whose public key has never been marked as valid for encryption. A strict failure there (as with a strict failure for lack of mdc) is a better scenario than a warning. If the user controls the secret key and they decide they want to be able to decrypt with it, they should be able to mark it as decryption-capable (if that's really what they want) and retry. But this is an action only for experts.

The same *cannot* be said for a subkey that is marked specifically for certification or signing, and not for decryption.

I understand the real world requirement for decrypting messages that have been encrypted to a revoked or expired key.

I don't see a problem. If you have the private key you can and will use it. I guess your concern is an oracle?

Fixed in master and 1.8.
@dkg: Thanks for the comments and your patience to convince me.

The next step is to release libgcrypt 1.8.4 :-)

Fixed in master and 2.2

Oh, that is really old code dating back to dirmngr-1. There is only one user I will see whether I can replace it with the generic parser we have in http.c

Now that is funny c+p code. I vaporized it to just a few lines.

It seems that this part of the code was not finished. Unfortunately upstream of the dns code is unresponsive and thus we started to maintain the code base by ourselves. There is still an open question whether we should do that to the full extend, in which case we would integrate the code closer into the GnuPG framework with its own logging subsystems.

Thanks.

Thanks.

Thanks.

Thanks.

Thanks

Thanks.

Thanks. May also happen if the first print_assuan_status fails.

Dear aheinecke,

Hi Adam,